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MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, ORE Committee on Comprehensive
Production Plan [REDACTED] 25X1A

6 Feb. 1950

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1A

SUBJECT : Report from Working Group

REFERENCES : a. Minutes of Committee's Second Meeting, 23 January 1950
25X1A b. Memorandum to [REDACTED] 26 January 1950,
subject: "Approach to Intelligence Production Planning."
c. First Report, 19 July 1949, Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee,
subject: "Analysis of ORE Production" [REDACTED] 25X1A

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1. A working group composed of [REDACTED] was
"appointed to investigate the needs of policy makers," and "then see"
if the [REDACTED] could contribute in any way to "this objective."

25X1A 2. Without necessarily endorsing all the concepts, distinc-
tions, or recommendations therein, the working group, in order to
economize in time and effort, agreed to proceed in conformity with
the general approach suggested in [REDACTED] memorandum to [REDACTED] 25X1A
26 January 1950 (Ref. b).

25X1A 3. The working group as a whole succeeded in defining a broad
area of substantial agreement, but the detailed recommendations in
this memorandum were worked out in the absence of [REDACTED] who was ill
last week. [REDACTED] approved the submission of this memorandum, which
he had endorsed in general terms, by the other two members of the
working group, reserving for himself the right to offer amendments
in his capacity as member of the parent Committee. Accordingly this
report from the working group contains the agreed recommendations of
[REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A 4. The working group as a whole examined the so-called [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Ref. c) and the reporting members agreed that it was useful
mainly in establishing that there was in existence no semblance of a
production "plan" to regulate ORE's work. The [REDACTED] also
was useful to the working group because it categorized the types of
intelligence actually produced by ORE, which presumably in some way
reflect the "needs of policy-makers." 25X1A

25X1A 5. The working group as a whole concluded that the mission of
the national (CIA) intelligence effort is the satisfaction of the
"needs of policy-makers" but that it is unfruitful to examine the
"needs of policy-makers" at great length or in great detail. As good
a general statement as could be agreed on might well be a paraphrase
of the suggestion made [REDACTED] in his 25 January memorandum, i.e.,
that "policy-makers need intelligence on foreign situations that may
affect US security interests."

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6. To go beyond this simple definition of the needs of policy-makers is to construct what [REDACTED] in his memorandum called an "anatomy" of the intelligence process. It easily can be elaborated to include a very simple "priority guide" listing the major kinds of information which are of significance in US policy-making. (Cf. [REDACTED] memorandum, Section IV, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6). This combined "anatomy" or table of categories of intelligence and simple priority listing would be the jumping-off point for the preparation of the only really useful "production plan." Such a "plan" would be a continuously revised "tentative schedule of projects" representing the best composite judgment (as of any one time) of a representative group of intelligence officers (substantively and globally competent) as to what intelligence would be needed by policy-makers in the next few months. (Cf. [REDACTED] memorandum, Section IV, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10.) The job of drafting and continuously revising such a "plan" is of course beyond the competence of our committee, although conceivably a test or pilot attempt might be made.

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7. The job before the committee is to approve a table of categories of intelligence, including a simple breakdown into major kinds of information of significance in US policy-making.

8. Besides recommending that the committee approve in general principle that this job is the immediate one ahead and that it fits into the total intelligence effort more or less as described in Cline's memorandum, the working group addressed itself to the problem of drafting a rough initial all intelligence plan.

9. As a basis for further discussion by the committee as a whole, the reporting members of the working group present the following draft of a table of intelligence categories and simplified listing of significant kinds of information. It is a slightly modified version of [REDACTED] "Anatomy of the Intelligence Process" (Part III of his memorandum) plus what seemed to be the "common denominator" of the various suggestions as to kinds of information needed by policy-makers (i.e., in the [REDACTED] and the various recommendations of the individual members of our committee to date).

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AND
A CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Categories	A: Basic Intelligence	B: Policy Intelligence			
Sub-Categories	(None)	1 Reportorial**	2 Reportorial-Analytic**	3 Analytic***	4 Estimative***
Type of Intelligence Product	Summary of Organized Information about the World and World Affairs, Abstracted from the Total Body of Accumulated Knowledge	Summary Description of New Event, Situation, or Trend in World Affairs	Preliminary Analysis of Reported New Event, Situation, or Trend in World Affairs	Summary Analysis of Situation or Trend in World Affairs, including Analysis of Immediate Bearing on US Security	Synthesis of One or More Situations or Trends of Significant Bearing on US Security, with <u>Contingent Prediction</u> of Future Projection of the Situation and <u>Estimate</u> of Future Bearing on US Security
Functional Spectrum or Continuum	Research/Collation/Summary	Collation/Summary	Summary/Analysis	Analysis/Synthesis	Synthesis/Estimate
Prototype among ORE Media of Dissemination	NIS Surveys*	CIA Daily**	CIA Weekly** ORE's and DI's of "Spot" Analysis Type Group B)	ORE's and DI's of the "background information" type study Group D)	ORE's and DI's of the "Estimative" type (Reitzel Report: Groups A, B, and C) I Nature of Situation as Projected (Global, Regional, National) A Power and Power Potential 1 Military Capabilities 2 Economic Capabilities B Intentions (as to Use of Military and Economic Power, especially in International Relations) 1 Attitudes of Organized Leaders 2 Stability of Leaders 3 Attitudes of Mass Supporters II Probability of Any Future Situation III Consequences of Any Situation

NOTES

1 This table is a highly "anatomic" abstraction of the intelligence process. Probably few intelligence products actually adhere rigidly to any of these categories. Many intelligence products undoubtedly contain some elements of all these categories. The abstraction is useful, however, in indicating the main emphasis that should be observed in intelligence products falling roughly into one or the other of these categories. It permits the process of drafting an intelligence production plan to proceed with some general understanding of what is being planned.

2 Not all ORE Media of Dissemination are listed as "Prototypes" of these categories. Specifically, whether or not they should do so, Situation Reports (SR's), Working Papers, and the CIA Monthly Series range over several of these categories.

* Comprehensive topical plan already exists in form of NIS outline

** Impossible to plan except in terms of media of dissemination

*** Must be planned continuously and for a comparatively short period (3-12 months) in form of a "tentative schedule of projects". These projects would consist of analyses or estimates of one or more factors in a situation (B-3 or B-4) and usually would estimate the nature (D-4-I), the probability (B-4-II), and/or the consequences (B-4-III) of the situation or some of its factors.